1 This is not to say that the initial lack of express provisions for the protection of human rights meant the absence of any protection. As early as 1969, the European Court of Justice (CJEU) held that fundamental rights were enshrined in the general principles of law that the Court protects. 2 The Court's motivation for protecting fundamental rights did not, however, derive from a sudden passion for rights. It is generally accepted that this decision was motivated by the need to respond to the German Federal Constitutional Court, which had threatened to disregard the primacy of EU law so long as the Community legal order lacked specific protection for fundamental rights. In addition to committing itself to the development of external policies that aimed to promote abroad the values proclaimed by the EU at home, numerous Treaty amendments adopted in the 1990s also made it clear that respect for human rights, along with the other EU's foundational values now codified in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), 10 constituted an eligibility condition for EU membership 8 Karen E Smith, European Foreign Policy in a Changing World 2nd edn (Cambridge: Polity Press 2008) 117. The Helsinki Final Act lists respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as among a total of 10 core principles which are supposed to guide relation between participating states. 9 On the emergence of human rights as a 'transversal' EU objective, see Barbara Brandter and Allan Rosas, 'Human rights and the external relations of the European Community: An analysis of doctrine and practice' (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 468. 10 The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty inserted a new provision into the TEU which made clear that the Union is founded on a number of key values. As amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, this provision now provides that 'The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-4 and an accession benchmark. 11 The 1993 Copenhagen European Council was also noteworthy in this regard, setting firm conditions for EU membership, including stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. providing that the Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by a number of principles which it seeks to advance in the wider world, and in particular democracy, the rule of law and the universality and indivisibility of human rights.
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The insertion of such unequivocal language regarding the role of human rights in the external relations of the EU into the Treaties called for a robust response from the EU institutions with responsibility for formulating, implementing and monitoring the EU's external human rights policy, prompting a period of intense internal is not empowered to play a role in the area of EU's external action. 29 Instead, the primary objective of the EU FRA is to provide EU institutions and its member states with assistance and expertise relating to fundamental rights when they implement EU law. The provision of this limited mandate means that in effect the EU has denied its own human rights agency the power to provide information and analysis of human rights developments in third countries with which the EU cooperates, and in particular those with which it has concluded association agreements and those which have been granted the status of candidate countries. Although this failure to empower the EU FRA to look at human rights protection in third countries is difficult to justify it may be explained by the reluctance of the Commission and Council to share this mission with an independent agency over which they would have no control. However, in excluding the FRA from this mission the EU has also denied itself access to greater expertise and objectivity in the monitoring of third countries with respect to their adherence to the EU's values. Moreover, it has been suggested that often glaring inconsistencies between the rhetoric and reality of EU human rights policy have not only diminished the impact of human rights demands in external relations, but also undermined the credibility of the EU as a human rights actor.
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In an effort to address these issues, the EU has sought, first and foremost, to Council of the EU on the same subject. 36 Since that time, the obligation to ensure the effective integration of human rights into EU external actions has been written into law and has been confirmed repeatedly in numerous policy statements.
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Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the High Representative for FASP Catherine Ashton announced a major review of all human rights processes within the EU's foreign affairs machinery. 38 As part of this review, the EU commissioned its first independent assessment of all EU-funded human rights  abolition of the death penalty;
 the eradication of torture;
 freedom of expression;
 freedom of religion;
 implementation of the UN guiding principles on business and human rights;
 the administration of justice;
 the protection of human rights defenders;
 the rights of children, women, indigenous peoples, minorities, persons with disabilities and
LGBT persons;
 compliance with international humanitarian law; and
It also listed a total of 96 actions, which the EU was committed to implementing by the end of December 2014, and which were intended to enhance the coherence and effectiveness of the EU as a human rights actor. In relation to the core issues of policy formulation and implementation, the Action Plan reaffirmed the EU's commitment to produce a tailor made human rights country strategy for each target state, and also commits the EU to a number of measures intended to ensure more effective mainstreaming of human rights with a commitment to the inclusion of human rights impact assessment at the heart of this. [a]4. MAIN EXTERNAL INSTRUMENTS [c]4.1.3
Multilateral diplomacy
In addition to bilateral human rights diplomacy, the EU also uses multilateral human rights diplomacy to pursue its external human rights policy. While human rights related issues can be, and in many cases have been, touched on in a variety of multilateral fora, the EU has long signalled its commitment to 'effective multilateralism' through the UN as the bedrock of the international system. [c]4.2.1
Generalised system of preferences
The Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) is a system of preferential trading arrangements developed in the 1970s through which the EU extends preferential access to its markets to developing countries' by offering unilateral and nonreciprocal trade preferences. 57 Since 1995, the GSP has included a negative conditionality clause, which provides for the temporary withdrawal of GSP preferences in whole or in part for products originating in a country that practises any form of slavery or forced labour, or a country that exports goods made by prison labour. Positive human rights conditionality was incorporated into the GSP in 2005 by means of a special incentive scheme, which tied additional preferences to recognition of labour rights. 58 The entire GSP has been reformed and simplified several times, most recently by Regulation 978/2012. 59 However, the most significant reform took place in 2005. 60 As part of this reform, the human rights grounds on which the general benefits provided under GSP could be temporarily withdrawn were expanded far beyond issues related to labour standards to include 'serious and systematic violation' of the principles laid down in a total of 16 international conventions. 61 While ratification of and Human Rights (Edward Elgar, 2017), pp. 243-266 23 these conventions is not a necessary condition for states to receive the benefits provided by the general scheme, violation of the rights they recognise is grounds for their withdrawal. 62 At the same time, the GSP+ scheme was launched on 1 July 2005.
The scheme provides benefits in the form of duty free access to EU markets for imported goods from countries with 'poorly diversified' economies that are 'therefore dependent and vulnerable' and that accept the main international conventions relating to social rights, environmental protection and good governance, including human rights. These benefits can also be withdrawn in case of violations.
While the rationale underlying the GPS+ scheme may be welcome, there is room for improvement as regards its implementation. The European Parliament has for instance suggested the need for a closer and more transparent monitoring of the 
.2 Other trade-related measures
In addition to the GSP, the EU has also introduced a number of specific trade-related human rights measures to regulate, in particular, the trade in arms and the trade in goods that could be used for capital punishment, torture, and cruel, inhuman and which codifies the EU rules governing the export of military technology and equipment largely set out in 1998. 65 In 2000, the Council issued its first regulation governing the export of 'dual-use' products and technologies of both civilian and military application. 66 In addition, the Council first adopted a common position on the control of arms brokering in 2003. 67 As part of its commitment to the abolition of the death penalty and the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, the EU also regulates the export of goods that could be used for capital punishment or torture. 68 The importation of certain categories of goods, the production of which is connected to human rights abuses, is also regulated in some instances. Precious gems including, in particular, 'conflict diamonds' represent a prominent example of the kind of goods targeted. The trade in rough diamonds has been subject to the Kimberley Process certification scheme since 2002, which prohibits the importation of uncertified rough diamonds in line with the provisions of a Council common position implementing the multilateral scheme. 69 Book chapter in S Douglas-Scott (ed) Previously, the so-called 'suspension clauses' negatively conditioned EU financial assistance to respect for the EU's values or principles -the two terms being used interchangeably most of the time -and could be triggered whenever a beneficiary country failed in this regard. Remarkably however, EU values were nowhere precisely defined or explained and the notion of 'serious and persistent human rights violation' was left undefined. In practice, this lack of definition meant that the EU had significant political leeway in deciding the circumstances under which a beneficiary country did not satisfactorily observe human rights. This issue will be further discussed below as suspension clauses can be explicitly found in most of the EU's external agreements, where they coexist with 'human rights clauses'.
[b]4.3 Bilateral External Agreements association agreements concluded by the EU with third countries since 1995. 82 The development and use of the standard human rights clause has been well documented elsewhere. 83 Suffice it to say here that the clause includes two elements. 84 88 The model clause, which it is intended will be included alongside the standard clause in all such future agreements, commits the Parties to the agreement to cooperation on human rights and is an attempt to ensure that, in addition to allowing for punitive action to be taken against states that are seen to violate human rights by means of the standard clause, the need for positive engagement is also explicitly recognised by both sides.
Moreover, by establishing human rights as an issue of common concern, the model clause also specifies human rights as an appropriate topic for discussion within the context of bilateral political dialogue more generally. In line with the 'Guidelines on 93 This wide-ranging measure, if fully implemented, has the potential to fundamentally alter the role of human rights in the EU's external relations, by ensuring that human rights concerns are not confined to certain policy areas but can rather inform the EU's overall engagement with third countries. However, this undertaking was not systematically applied to all trade agreements negotiated in the year following announcement of the Strategic Framework. 94 Moreover, it has also been argued that in the absence of an agreed methodology, which would provide a significant role for civil society, such assessments may fail to influence subsequent negotiations in any visible way.
[a]5. CONCLUDING REMARKS In an important report published in 1998 and commissioned by the EU on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it was noted that 'the EU has devoted a great deal of energy and resources to human rights, both in its internal and its external policies. Yet the fragmented and hesitant nature of many of its initiatives has left the Union with a vast number of individual policies and programmes without a real human rights policy as such.' 101 Fast-forwarding 15 years later, a broadly similar diagnosis could unfortunately be rendered. While the need for increased coherence and consistency across all policy areas and a reduction in the gap between rhetoric and action are widely acknowledged, the EU's approach remains piecemeal and overly focused on exporting its values globally while internally, national governments of EU member states continue to appear reluctant to allow the EU to develop a similarly ambitious internal human rights policy and subject themselves to level of human rights monitoring equal to that applied to non-EU countries.
In spite of these shortcomings however, there has been some progress.
Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Charter of Fundamental
Rights has finally become a legally binding and core element of the Union's legal order, and the EU has at last gained the power to seek accession to the ECHR. 
